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quiet title action in the future against parties asserting an

i

interest in the six-acre tract, and she may or may not prevail,
and that may in large measure turn on the issue of notice. The
parties presently asserting an interest in the six acres were not
before the court at the time of trial, and defendant had no
obligation to bring them before the court in order to defend
against the claims of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs did not seek to

quiet the title to the six acres in themselves.
referred to in their pleadings.

That is nowhere

Plaintiffs1 pleadings are based

upon the assertion that the entire property had been returned to
the defendant.

Paragraph 18 of plaintiffs' Complaint states:

"Termination of the contract between plaintiffs and
defendant and repossession of the entire property by
defendant including the six acres previously released
has resulted in defendant receiving damages so
disproportionate to any loss actually sustained by
defendant or which could have been reasonably
contemplated by the parties as to be exorbitant, to
shock the conscience and to unjustly enrich the
defendant." (Emphasis added.)
Such is not the fact, and defendant so answered and proved.

And

that in itself should have been conclusive against any judgment in
favor of plaintiffs in this proceeding.
The finding of the court that defendant owns no interest
in the six acres, and the court's incorporation of that finding as
paragraph 3 of the Judgment and Decree are not only contrary to
the weight of the evidence, but are error as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs never had nor claimed any interest in the six acres.
This lawsuit was commenced in July 1985 by plaintiffs'
predecessors, and plaintiffs purchased the lawsuit by Assignment

of Claims and Cause of Action (Exhibit 19) on January 30, 1987.
Plaintiffs did not purchase any interest in the six acres by the
terms of that instrument or otherwise.

In fact, Ferron Elder, one

of the plaintiffs1 predecessors, purportedly conveyed the property
five months earlier to Darrell Didericksen b^ Warranty Deed dated
February 5, 1985, and recorded April 22, 1985 (Ex. 23). There is
no way the court could adjudicate the title to the six acres in
plaintiffs, and the court's finding and adjudici..*•-

defendant

has no interest in the property is improper and meaningless. Had
plaintiff been claiming ownership of the six acres, the court,
upon proper pleadings and evidence, could have adjudicated the
ownership of the property between plaintiffs and defendant,
although the judgment woi 11 d i 101 be bindi ng upon persons not
parties to this action.

But it is a meaningless exercise for the

court to purport to determine the ownership of the six acres
against the defendant when the plaintiffs weren't claiming
ownership thereof—and could not.

For the court to gratuitously

rule that defendant doesn't own the property was beyond what the
court was asked or required to do.

The court could certainly go

no further than to rule that defendant did not get the six acres
back, and has never been made whole, and has been damaged thereby.
To attempt to go beyond that in its ruling is a nullity.
One must ask the question, how does the ruling that
defendant does not
not claim the property?

the property help plaintiffs when they do
Even if this were construed as a quiet-

title action between plaintiffs and defendant, plaintiffs cannot
rely on the weakness, if any, of defendant's title.

It is

axiomatic in Utah that in an action to quiet title plaintiffs must
succeed by virtue of strength of their own title, rather than on
the weakness, if any, of their opponent's title.

See Babcock v.

Dangerfield, 98 Ut 10, 94 P2d 862 (1939); Mercur Coalition Mines
Co. v. Cannon, 112 Ut 13, 184 P2d 341 (1947).
Where plaintiffs are not even claiming ownership, and
cannot so claim, the court cannot go afield and attempt to quiet
title to the property against the defendant.
quieting the title in favor of?

Who is the court

It makes no sense to quiet title

against someone if you don't quiet title in favor of someone. If
a finding that plaintiffs owned the property, or did not own the
property, were necessary to a determination of plaintiffs' cause,
then it might be a proper subject of a ruling in this action.
court did not have to make that determination.

The

All the court had

to determine was whether or not defendant got the property back.
If defendant did not get the property back, then the court should
have ruled that plaintiffs could not succeed in their action as
return of all of the property is necessary to a claim for
unconscionable forfeiture.

Even if defendant is in error in that,

however, the most the court was required to determine under any
theory was the value of the property not returned, not its
ownership.

The Real Estate Contract of December 19, 1980, (Ex. 5)
clearly refers to a sale of 76 acres and provides for a means of
payment for the full 7 6 acres.

It is clear under Perkins v.

Spencer, 121 Ut 468, 243 P2d 446 (1952), that the six acres has
not been returned—either because it is hopelessly encumbered or
because the plaintiffs have somehow obtained a deed to it and sold
it (whether through error or otherwise).

Without the return of

the whole 76 acres, there is no basis for an action for
reimbursement in any event.

Defendant does not get her land back,

and for the trial court to rule in effect that defendant is not
entitled to return of the six acres (before any reimbursement for
an unconscionable forfeiture) is error, as the essence of such an
action is that the seller got both the 1and and the money.
Without a return of the six acres, defendant did not get the land
and the money, and unless the land is returned, there is no basis
for any claim by plaintiffs.

As land is considered "unique" in

the law, it seems clear that the exact land that is sold must be
returned, not other land and not a credit of some kind.
In view of the severely-depressed market in Duchesne
County, Utah, it may be economically impractical to attempt to
pursue a quiet title action to the six acres as against
Didericksen and the bank to whom he has mortgaged the property.
It may be determined that costs of suit for that effort may well
exceed the value of the land, or at least make the effort
financially impractical.

Further, the futility of the lower

court's order is demonstrated sincethe purported adjudication of
the lower court that defendant does not own the six acres would
not appear to be res judicata as to a subsequent quiet-title
action by defendant against Didericksen and the bank to whom he
sold the property, or any subsequent owner.

As it was not

necessary in this action for the court to determine whether
defendant owned the six acres or not, such determine is
immaterial, unessential and therefore not res judicata in a
subsequent action.

46 Am Jr 2d, Judgments, Section 423, states:

"For a judgment to operate as res judicata and be
conclusive evidence of a fact sought to be established by
it, it must appear that the fact was a material or essential
one, and that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the matter. In this respect, the general
rule is that the judgment in the former action operates as
an estoppel only as to matters which were necessarily
involved and determined in the former action, and is not
conclusive as to matters which were immaterial or
unessential to the determination of the prior action, or
which were not issuable therein, or which were not germane
to, implied in, or essentially connected with, the actual
issues in the case, or which were not necessary to uphold
the judgment. This rule has been applied, although such
matters were presented in the earlier action and actually
determined therein, and although they may affect the
ultimate rights of the parties."
Furthermore, any determination in this action would not
be res judicata because Didericksen did not take title from
plaintiffs and is therefore not in privity with them.

See 46 Am

Jur 2d, Judgments, Section 533. Whatever title Didericksen may
have, if any, does not come from these plaintiffs, and he is in no
sense a successor to them.

POINT II. EARNEST MONEY AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WERE
NOT EXECUTED CONCURRENTLY, AND RULES APPLICABLE TO DOCUMENTS
EXECUTED CONCURRENTLY ARE NOT APPLICABLE.
In support

of plaintiffs1 claim that defendant is not

entitled to the six acres, they argue that seven documents were
concurrently executed at the closing. (See page 23 of respondents1
Brief.)

Apparently plaintiffs are attempting by that reasoning to

explain away paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Contract of December
19, 1980, which requires an additional payment of $3,000 per acre
to be made before conveyance of the six acres to Elder.

One

however canvasses the seven documents in vain for any provision in
any of them which relieves buyer of the requirement of paying an
extra amount of $3,000 per acre before the property is conveyed.
Both the Warranty Deed (see page 3 of Addendum "C" of plaintiffs1
Brief) and the Quit-claim Deed (Exhibit 10) cover the total 76
acres.

The only document that could lend any support to

plaintiffs1 argument is the Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit 4),
but, by its own terms, it was abrogated by the execution of the
Real Estate Contract.

See line 43 of the said Earnest Money

Agreement, which states:

" . . . execution of the final contract

shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase."
By its nature the Earnest Money was intended to be in existence
prior to the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

That is its logical

position where a number of documents are executed.
states at page 20 of her Brief:

Defendant

" . . . in the absence of anything to indicate a
contrary intention, instruments executed at the same
time, by the same contracting parties for the same
purpose . . . will be considered and construed together
since they are, in the eyes of the law, one contract or
instrument."
The problem with that, however, is that a contrary
intention is indicated.

The Earnest Money provides that it is to

be abrogated upon signing of the final contract, and that
expressly sets forth the intent of the parties, and where the
language is clear, it is not necessary nor permissible to seek the
intent of the parties elsewhere.

Furthermore, as the Earnest

Money is by its nature a preliminary agreement, it will in law be
deemed to have been executed prior to (not concurrently with) the
Real Estate Contract and hence to be abrogated by the signing of
that final contract.

It may have served to justify the payment of

a commission, but it had no other effect.

Plaintiffs' assertion

at page 10 of their Brief, "It was the intent of Malnar and Elder
that Elder receive title to the six (6) acre parcel at closing on
December 19, 1980," flies directly in the face of the actual
documents themselves.

Plaintiffs1 assertion therefore (at page 24

of their Brief) that "It cannot be disputed" that the seven
documents were intended to be one is erroneous for the foregoing
reason, and because (1) of Mrs. Malnar's testimony referred to in
her Brief that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
signed on December 19, 1980, was placed in front of her as part of
the closing documents without her understanding what it purported,
and (2) her further statement that she understood that the six-

acre deed was being placed in escrow, to be released upon payment
of additional consideration.

These facts leave all kinds of room

to "dispute" plaintiffs1 "seven documents" theory, and effectively
do so.
Defendant and Ferron Elder first entered into a written
agreement with each other on July 23, 1980. At that time an
Option Agreement was executed by defendant (Exhibit 46) and an
Earnest Money and Offer to Purchase (Exhibit 3) was also executed
by the parties. The Earnest Money for was for the sale of the sixacre tract which we are discussing, and the Option Agreement
covered the other 70 acres. The Earnest Money (Exhibit 3)
provided that it was conditioned upon the execution of the Option
Agreement.

The Earnest Money provided for release of one-acre

parcels from the six-acre tract upon payment of $2,200 per acre
for each acre released.

The Option Agreement provided for the

release of ten-acre parcels from the 70-acre tract upon payment of
$2,200 per acre in addition to the annual payment.

The Earnest

Money Agreement provided for a commission of $20 to Labrum Real
Estate, and the Option Agreement provided for a real estate
commission of $2,200.

The total purchase price was therefore

$105,000 for the 70 acres and $9,000 for the six acres, for a
total of $114,000, with a combined down payment of $23,400 ($5,000
plus $16,000 plus $2,400).
The validity of the Option is questionable.

No amount

of money was paid for the Option, although $5,000 was apparently

to be paid several months later on September 1, 1980. As there
was no obligation on the part of Elder to pay the $5,000f the
Option would presumably be unenforceable.

If the Option was

unenforceable, then the Earnest Money, being conditioned upon
execution of the Option, might likewise be deemed to be a nullity.
In any event, the $5,000 was never paid on September 1,
1980, and was apparently tendered to Mrs. Malner on November 12,
1980.
47).

She returned the same as being out of time (see Exhibit
Between November 22 and the closing on December 19, the

parties negotiated a new agreement.

Duchesne County was seeing

boom times with prices rising, and a new sales price of $152,000
was negotiated.

Plaintiffs concede this and at page 29 of their

Brief state that their appraiser, Jud Harward:
"testified that the subject property was
value. In July 1980 it was worth $1,500
143) On December 18 and 19, 1980 it was
acre. On December 30, 1980 it was worth

increasing in
per acre. (Tr.
worth $2,000 per
$3,500 per acre."

The new contract (Ex. 5) incorporated the same release of acreage
concept and in fact was initially typed with the $2,200 figure,
which was crossed out and the figure $3,000 inserted and initialed
by the parties, showing their specific agreement on that point.
(See Ex. 5, paragraph 17.)

It is evident that the Earnest Money

Agreement of December 19, 1980, did not reflect the agreement of
the parties with regard to release of acreage.

The fact that the

final documents are at variance with the Earnest Money appears to
be conclusive on that point.

The only purpose that the Earnest

Money Receipt served, given the fact that it contained the

abrogation language referred to above, was to provide for a $2,200
commission, because coming into the closing no commission was
payable since the Option had not been taken up and the first
Earnest Money was presumably invalid, but in any event only
provided for a $20 commission.
Furthermore, the Earnest Money dated December 18, 1980,
which was apparently signed on December 19, 1980, (Ex. 4) varies
in a number of other respects from the actual contract which was
signed.

The Real Estate Contract provided for the recording of a

notice of interest and contains other provisions not referred to
in the Earnest Money.

For example, in paragraph 14 it contains a

covenant limiting alienation of the contract not referred to in
the Earnest Money.

It has a provision (paragraph 3) relating to

early payments which is not referred to in the Earnest Money, and
provisions (paragraph 4) relating to escrow which are not referred
to in the Earnest Money.

Also, as noted, the Quit-claim Deed

which was placed in escrow (Ex. 10) referred to the entire 76
acres and, had the parties intended the release of six acres at
closing, the Quit-claim would only have been drawn for 70 acres.
Likewise the Warranty Deed placed in escrow to convey the property
upon payment in full of the contract (page 3 of Addendum "C" to
plaintiffs1 Brief) referred to 76 acres. A Warranty Deed covering
the entire 76 acres would not be necessary in the event the
parties had agreed at closing to convey six acres.

And of course, as noted earlier, the Stipulation entered
into March 7, 1985, (Exhibit 26) declares the full 76 acres to be
the property of Mrs. Malnar.

Plaintiffs' assertion at page 43 of

their Brief is deceptive in that it quotes one paragraph from the
said Stipulation and from that argues that "Elder was entitled to
the eminent domain award" and that the language in paragraph 3 of
the Stipulation was "clearly consistent with that stipulation."
This selective vision, which ignores the first two paragraphs of
the same Stipulation, is remarkable to say the least.
of the Stipulation provides:

Paragraph 1

"Marvel Malnar is the record owner

of that certain real property involved in the above-entitled
action to which the aforementioned defendants are parties, the
real property being more particularly described as: . . . " and
there then follows the legal description of the entire 76-acre
tract.

Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the Stipulation states:

"The

parties agree that the defendant, Marvel Malnar, is exclusively
entitled to any damages awarded in connection with the aboveentitled action for the taking, severance and other consequential
damages as they relate to the portion of the above-described
property that plaintiff [Deseret Generation & Transmission
Cooperative] has taken and now occupies, which portion is a small
part of the larger parcel described above."

(Emphasis added.)

It is thus seen from explicit and unambiguous language
that plaintiffs' predecessors both acknowledged that the defendant
was then the owner of the whole 76-acre parcel and entitled to all

of the eminent domain proceeds, which is clearly inconsistent with
any argument by plaintiffs that somehow Elder and his associates
and their successors (the plaintiffs herein) should get any
entitlement to any eminent domain proceeds.

To hold otherwise is

to rewrite the Stipulation.
Furthermore, at page 24 of their Brief plaintiffs
assert that paragraph 17 in the Uniform Real Estate Contract
refers to property other than the six-acre tract, but that is not
what it says.

That simply was not the agreement of the parties.

POINT III.

THE UTAH CASE OF BUTLER V. WILKINSON IS NOT

MISREPRESENTED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
The plaintiffs assert at page 31 of their Brief that
defendant "misrepresents the holding in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740
P2d 1244 (Utah 1987)" and conclude by asserting that that case is
"factually and legally inapposite."

Defendant does not believe

that anything was misrepresented in connection with that case.
Appellant's Brief at pages 20 and 21 accurately quoted from the
decision.

The plaintiffs devote twelve lines to the case and

nowhere attempt to analyze or explain the portions quoted from the
case by the defendant, nor to indicate wherein there was any
misrepresentation.

The case is directly against the plaintiffs

and precludes any recovery by them.

It is perhaps understandable

that they chose not to discuss it at any length.
In the Butler case the court had to determine what
equity Themy had in the property and whether or not that equity

was still available or whether it terminated with Themyfs interest
under the contract.

The court found that Themy's interest had not

been terminated and that $186,300 was available for creditors.
The court went on, however, to find at page 1259 that Christensen
was entitled to the benefit of the doctrine that "The lien of a
judgment against a person for whose benefit another holds the
legal title to lands is not effective as against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser from the trustee without notice of the trust . . ."
(The foregoing is quoted in the Butler decision from 46 Am Jur 2d,
Judgments, Section 297, at page 501 [1969].)

The court further

found that Christensen was a bona fide purchaser and that he had
made adequate investigation as to the status of the title and was
entitled to rely upon representations that Themy no longer had an
interest in the property.
Each of the matters decided was necessary to the court's
decision.

It is clear that the "judicial mind" was carefully

applied to each of the foregoing points and that each was a
building block used by the court in reaching its ultimate
decision.

Had any increase in value (Themy1s equity) been

available to Themy, notwithstanding forfeiture, and thus available
to his creditors, it would not have been necessary for the court
to determine the issue of whether there was a valid forfeiture.
Certainly the points cited by respondents in their Brief were
points of law deliberately passed upon by the court in its
carefully-reasoned decision.

Even where a decision of a court

could be supported on one of several reasons given by that court
for its decision, all reasons given are nevertheless part of the
holding of the case.

See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 US

535, 93 L ed 1524, 69 S Ct 1235 (1949).

Certainly the "radiating

potencies" of the Butler decision "tilt the balanced mind toward
submission and agreement."

Hawkes v. Hammill, 288 US 52, 77 L ed

610, 53 S Ct 240 (1933).
Furthermore, the decision in Butler that any increase in
the value is only available to a purchaser until he is forfeited
accords with common sense and is self-evident.

It is in accord

with the other Utah cases cited in appellant's Brief, to-wit,
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P2d 1082 (Utah 1983), Warner v. Rassmusen,
704 P2d 562 (Utah 1985) and Kay v. Wood, 549 P2d 709 (Utah 1976).
Plaintiffs do not discuss the "increase in value aspect" of any of
these cases. And the Butler decision seems to be fully in accord
with decisions from other states.

See, for example, the case of

Friedman vs. Rector, Etc., of St. Mathias Parish, 230 P2d 629
(California 1951), in which the seller sold two lots for $18,000.
A $2,000 down payment was made by the buyer and he then repudiated
the contract.

He later changed his mind and sought specific

performance or, that failing, for restitution of the down payment.
The court denied specific performance, and with respect to
restitution of the down payment the court said that $900 of the
down payment went to the real estate commission so that the
maximum that he could recover was $1,100.

The court said that

there were other issues relating to other expenses which the
seller might be justified in offsetting against that sum and
therefore remanded the case for further trial on that limited
issue.

The seller had resold the lots for $20,000, and the point,

therefore, is that under the theory urged by the plaintiffs in
this action, restitution to the buyer would be for the difference
between the balance owing at the time of default, which was
$16,000, and the value of the property returned to the seller.

As

the seller sold the property almost immediately after forfeiture
for $20,000, its value was obviously $20,000. Therefore, under
plaintiffs' theory the seller owed the difference of $4,000 to the
buyer.

He, of course, was not awarded that as the Supreme Court

of California said that the maximum liability of seller would be
the $1,100, in other words, the part of the payment which exceeded
seller's damages, but not including any increase in value of the
property.

Defendant has been unable to find any case anywhere

awarding a defaulting seller any increase in the value of the
property, nor have plaintiffs cited any, all of which demonstrates
that Butler was fairly characterized by defendant and that it
states the general rule nationwide.
At page 32 of their Brief plaintiffs deny that the trial
court credited them with the increased value of the land, but that
assertion is totally inaccurate.

Their claimed restitution figure

of $71,183.14 can only be arrived at by charging defendant with
the increased value as though it were a payment to her.

On page

43 all pretense is dropped and plaintiffs show as an "alternative"
computation showing the receipt by defendant of her own land as an
overpayment on the contract.

There is no way to arrive at any

restitution figure to plaintiffs without charging defendant for
the increase in the value of the land she gets back and then
requiring her to reimburse that sum to plaintiffs as an
overpayment.
POINT IV.

DEFAULTING BUYER CANNOT, BY ENCUMBERING

TITLE, IMPOSE ON SELLER DECLINE IN MARKET VALUE INCURRED DURING
PERIOD TITLE IS ENCUMBERED.
Plaintiffs argue at page 18 that defendant's actual
damages were "Properly Calculated as of February 3, 1984, The Date
She Terminated The contract."

Although perhaps damages are

usually determined with reference to the time of breach, the facts
of this case take this case outside of the usual situation, and as
of February 3, 1984, under any interpretation of this case,
defendant did not have all of the property back in a condition in
which she could sell it, and she is not required to attempt to
sell a property which by reason of title defects is not
marketable.

No person is required to do a useless act.

The six

acres were hopelessly encumbered as of February 3, 1984. Also, a
Notice of Interest (Ex. 24) appeared of record against the entire
76 acres within 11 days after February 3, 1984, and plaintiff's
predessors were still asserting a right to the 76 acres and to the
eminent domain proceeds.

The matter of the entitlement to eminent

domain proceeds and to the ownership of the 76 acres
(nothwithstanding recording of the Quit-claim Deed) was not
resolved until the Stipulation was signed March 7, 1985, (Ex, 26)
in which the plaintiffs1 predecessors conceded that defendant
owned all of the 76 acres and that the eminent domain proceeds
were to be hers.

That would be the earliest time at which the

matter of the title was in any manner resolved, and defendant
cannot equitably be considered to have taken the property back any
earlier than that date.

Testimony as to value at that date

clearly was that the market was in the severe decline,and the
entire property was not worth more than $98,000.
It seems grossly unjust to assert that defendant is
chargeable with the value of property as of February 3, 1984, when
she was, by actions of the plaintiffs, precluded from saving
herself from loss by selling at whatever the J:hen-market was.
Plaintiffs contend that the market was very high at that time, and
defendant denies that it was anywhere near as high as plaintiffs
claim, but it was clear by all testimony that it severely declined
after February 3, 1984, and it is not equitable to impose on
defendant the consequences of that decline when breach of contract
by plaintiffs' predecessors and their subsequent conduct prevented
defendant from trying to salvage what she could after such breach.
Defendant respectfully submits that plaintiffs should bear the
loss due to the delay in returning clear title to the property to
defendant by determining value at the later date, or at least by

charging plaintiffs with interest representing the value of the
loss of use of the land during the delay period.
At page 35 plaintiffs assert that at trial they were
willing to release the Notice of Interest "as successors in
interest of the majority of partners in Eastern Utah Resources."
The fact of the matter is that plaintiffs only purchased this
lawsuit for restitution.
action."

(See Ex. 19.)

All they purchased was this "legal
They did not buy the land, nor any

interest therein.

They did not buy the partnership, nor any

interest therein.

There is no document that they could sign that

would clear title

to the 76 acres, or any part of it.

POINT V. EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDS ARE NOT A PAYMENT ON
THE CONTRACT, BUT RATHER STAND IN PLACE OF THE LAND TAKEN.
At pages 40 and 41 of plaintiffs' Brief, they argue that
the contract purchaser is entitled to the eminent domain proceeds.
Defendant normally would not quarrel with that position and so
stated in her Brief on page 38. By virtue of the Stipulation of
March 7, 1985 (Exhibit 26), however, it was settled that the
proceeds belonged to defendant, and they were obviously intended
to compensate defendant for the damage to the property which she
took back under the contract.

It is certainly not fair for

plaintiffs to have credit for the eminent domain proceeds as a
payment on the contract, but to impose upon defendant the
uncompensated burden of the damaged property.

If defendant has to

take back the property, subject to the impediment imposed upon it

by Deseret Transmission, she is entitled to compensation for that
damage to the property and the plaintiffs do not get to "doubledip" by claiming credit therefor as a payment somehow on the
contract.

At page 42 plaintiffs state,. "However, the $35,075

award Malnar eventually received had the effect of reducing the
February 3, 1984, contract balance of $101,919.35 to $66,844.35."
In other words, plaintiffs clearly are claiming that the eminent
domain proceeds constitute a payment on the contract,
notwithstanding they were not received until 1985 and 1986. If
indeed they are somehow to constitute a payment on the contract,
then it can only be because the contract is in existance and was
never forfeited, and we are in that event faced with an entirely
different legal situation.

We would be left with the result that

the contract is still in full force and effect with a balance
owing of $66,844.35 plus interest and, no payment having been made
since 1986, the contract would be in default once again and the
defendant would be forced to make an election as to how she would
proceed.
A number of times in their Brief (see, for example,
page 32 and page 40) respondents assert that, because of the
condemnation action, they would have had the right to rescind the
Real Estate Contract.

Whether that is so or not is an issue that

we need not reach because the buyer never so elected and was not
in a position to return all of defendant's property to her, which

return would have been a precondition to any rescission in any
event.
POINT VI. TO ALLOW CREDIT TO DEFAULTING BUYER FOR
INCREASE IN VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY IS NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO
PRECEDENT, BUT WOULD VIRTUALLY DESTROY THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT AS
A VIABLE MEANS OF ALIENATING PROPERTY.
It seems clear that if the court were to uphold the
plaintiffs1 theory that the seller must account to the buyer for
any increase in value, it would be contrary to all precedent,
contrary to the reasonable expectations (under existing precedent)
of a seller, and furthermore it will effectively destroy the sale
of real property by contract.
The principal reason that landowners sell by contract is
because of the remedy afforded them for forfeiture.

Any other

remedy is perhaps better achieved through a mortgage or trust
deed.

Being able to sell on a contract, however, enables many

buyers to purchase properties which they otherwise would not be
able to buy through conventional financing.

They are able to buy

properties with small down payments, and sellers are willing to
enter into agreements of that kind because they have the rather
speedy remedy of forfeiture in the event of default.

No seller is

going to utilize the forfeiture provision of the real estate
contract if he has to pay buyer any increase in the value of
property because no seller in his right mind is going to want to
take the risk that the defaulting buyer may be able to find a more

persuasive real estate appraiser who will testify to increases in
value which may be accepted by the fact finder.

Allowing a

defaulting buyer to charge the seller with any "increase in sales
price" will certainly be the death knell for sales by contract. A
defaulting buyer should not be so rewarded, and he does not need
such a provision because if there is in fact an "increase" in
value, the buyer, if he cannot make the payments on the property,
can sell the property for that "increase" and pay off the seller
and keep the profit. What prudent buyer, if in fact he is holding
a contract to purchase which has "increased" in value, would let
it be lost through forfeiture in the first place, since he can
protect himself by selling it?

If anyone needs protection, it is

a defaulting buyer holding a property which has decreased in value
as his situation may be desperate.

A buyer holding a property

which has increased in value does not need any special protection,
nor is he entitled to it, and he should not be rewarded for his
own default, and certainly not for his own failure to promptly
market a property which has substantially increased in value when
he cannot make the payments.
POINT VII.

PLAINTIFFS ARE IN NO EVENT ENTITLED TO

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Defendant/appellant/cross-respondent herewith responds
to the Cross-Appeal and contends that plaintiffs are entitled to
no judgment whatever as heretofore discussed, and if defendant is
correct in that position, then of course no interest would be

owing.

Even if plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment of some

kind, they are not entitled to prejudgment interest.
Defendant Malnar cites Bjork v. April Industries, Inc./
560 P2d 315 (Utah 1977), in support of her contention that
prejudgment interest should not in any event be allowed to
plaintiffs in this action.

In Bjork the Supreme Court of Utah set

forth at page 317 a summary of the law of prejudgment interest in
Utah and in footnote 4 of said summary the court refers to the
following three Utah cases:

Jack B. Parson Construction Company

v. State of Utah, 552 P2d 107 (Utah 1976), Uinta Pipeline v. White
Superior Company, 546 P2d 885 (Utah 1976), and Fell v. Union
Pacific, 32 Ut 101, 88 P 1003 (1907).

The said statement of the

court in Bjork found at page 317 is an attempt to summarize the
earlier decisions of the court.

In Bjork the Court set forth the

law as follows:
"As to the allowance of interest before judgment,
this Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is
clear, viz: where the damage is complete and the amount
of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that
loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time and not from the date
of the judgment. On the other hand, where damages are
incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, wrongful
death, defamation of character, false imprisonment,
etc., the amount of the damage must be ascertained and
assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and in
such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed."
(Emphasis added.)
Judge Bunnell's theory of damages set forth in paragraph
6 of the Memorandum Decision and incorporated in substance as
paragraph 25 of the Findings of Fact includes the amount received

by defendant from condemnation in his computation as though the
same were a payment on the balance owing on the contract.
Likewise, in the theory of the plaintiffs, which the Court adopted
as paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact, the same eminent domain
proceeds are credited as though a payment by the plaintiffs to the
defendant.
The eminent domain proceeds were not received by
defendant until a considerable period of time after the Quit-claim
Deed was delivered to defendant from escrow and recorded on
February 3, 1984. Malnar received from the condemnation $9,075 in
1985, and the balance of $32,000 was received in 1986.
There is therefore no way that the defendant could be
charged interest on the receipt of those sums from February 3,
1984.

The very request for interest points out the error in the

Court's decision in the first place.

It is impossible to claim,

as required by Bjork, that damages were complete as of February 3,
1984, when an important element of those damages (according to
defendants), to-wit, $35,075, was not received until over a year
later, and most of it two years later.

The condemnation action

was not disposed of until 1986, at which time the Court in that
condemnation action made its decision.

So far as was known in

1984 the eminent domain proceeds could have been double that
ultimately awarded or one-half that ultimately awarded.

The point

is that they were not fixed until the Court made its final ruling
in the condemnation action in 1986.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to interest from the date of
the last payment to defendant of eminent domain proceeds in 1986.
There is no theory upon which interest could be awarded from that
interim point.

If interest is owing, it is owing from February 3,

1984f or not at all.
For the reasons stated, plaintiffs are not entitled to
any judgment against defendant, and in any event damages were not
complete as of February 3, 1984, even under the erroneous theory
used to arrive at that Judgment, and therefore plaintiffs are not
entitled to the claimed prejudgment interest in any event.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully
requests that the decision of the lower court be reversed and that
judgment be entered in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action.
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